Based Key Agreement

In cryptography, a key method of agreement with password authentication is an interactive method for two or more parties to set up cryptographic keys based on the knowledge of a password by one or more parties. Key calling, verified by the password, is a process in which a customer receives a static key in a password-based negotiation with a server that knows the password data. B for example the Ford and Kaliski methods. In the strictest configuration, a party uses only one password associated with N servers (two or more) to retrieve a static key. This is completed in such a way as to protect the password (and key) even if the server`s N-1 is completely compromised. The KA (Key Agreement) protocol is used to establish secure communication between two or more parties and authenticate entities in an open environment. With the advent of identity cryptography, Smart [6] introduced the first bipartisan identity-based key memorandum of understanding (ID-KA) that accepted the IBE scheme [7]. Since then, many IDENTIFICATION-KA protocols have been presented successively [1, 8-11]. These IDENTIFICATION-KA protocols have been demonstrated as being safe in different models such as the BJM [12], br4, CK, etc. Huang and Cao [13] provided the first detectable IDENTIFICATION-AK protocol in the eCK model [14].

Based on the BJM [12] model, Chen et al. [9] proposed the ID-BJM model and built key agreement protocols based on identity. In order to implement detailed access control, session keys are negotiated on the basis of mutual authentication of participant attribute information. many attribute-based Key Agreement (AB-KA) protocols [15-20] are presented. In AB-KA protocols, attribute-based encryption (ABE) plays an important role in protecting secret messages used to generate session keys. ABE [21] was divided mainly into two categories called ABE (CP-ABE) and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) breakage codes. In CP-ABE, the data owner selects an access structure for attributes and encrypts the data with the corresponding attribute of the public key. The access structure is integrated into the encryption text, while the secret key is created based on the data user`s attribute.

If a user`s attributes fill the access structure built into the text, he decrypts that encryption text [22]. The KP-ABE scheme is reversed. The encryptor selects descriptive attributes to encrypt the data. Recently, Li et al. [23, 24] presented two CP-ABE schemes with an effective waiver of the attribute that opposes the attack on Dieskokunden`s customers and supports fine grain access control. There are a few decentralized CP-ABE schemes that protect privacy, in which the size of the encryption text increases linearly with the number of attributes built into the access policy.

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